In the 1944 case of Skidmore et al. v. Swift & Co., employees at a meat packing plant filed suit against their employer, Swift & Co., for overtime pay they believed they were owed under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The workers claimed that time spent on standby during lunch and rest periods should be considered as working hours, thus making them eligible for overtime compensation. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the employees but did not establish a clear rule regarding what constitutes work time under FLSA. Instead, it held that whether or not an employee's time is compensable depends on the circumstances and facts of each individual case. This decision established what has come to be known as "Skidmore deference," which means courts will give weight to a government agency's interpretation of laws within its jurisdiction based on factors such as consistency, thoroughness demonstrated in consideration, validity of reasoning etc.

In the dissenting opinion for Skidmore et al. v. Swift & Co., Justice Robert H. Jackson argued that the majority's decision to defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute was inappropriate and set a dangerous precedent. He contended that it is not within the purview of agencies like the Wage and Hour Division, but rather courts, to interpret laws passed by Congress. He expressed concern about potential overreach by executive branch agencies if their interpretations were given too much weight in judicial decisions, arguing this could undermine separation of powers principles fundamental to American democracy. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority’s view on compensable work time under Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), asserting that waiting time should not be considered as working hours unless explicitly specified in employment contracts or collective bargaining agreements.