Slaughter v. Glenn was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state could constitutionally require a non-resident to pay a tax on the transfer of real estate located within the state. The case was brought by a resident of the state of Virginia, who had inherited a tract of land in the state of North Carolina. The plaintiff argued that the North Carolina statute requiring him to pay a tax on the transfer of the land was unconstitutional, as it violated the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court held that the North Carolina statute was constitutional, as it did not discriminate against non-residents. The Court reasoned that the statute was a valid exercise of the state's power to tax, and that the tax was not so onerous as to be unconstitutional. The Court further held that the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect non-residents from taxation, as the clause was intended to protect citizens of the United States from discrimination by their own state. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the North Carolina statute requiring a non-resident to pay a tax on the transfer of real estate located within the state was constitutional. The Court reasoned that the statute was a valid exercise of the state's power to tax, and that the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect non-residents from taxation.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Slaughter v. Glenn, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to both law and justice. He argued that a contract between two parties should be enforced according to its terms, and any ambiguity should be resolved against the party who drafted it. In this case, he believed that there was no ambiguity in the language of the contract; rather, he felt that it clearly stated what each party had agreed upon and thus should have been upheld by the court. Furthermore, Justice Field noted that even if there were some ambiguity present in regards to certain provisions of the contract, such ambiguities could not justify disregarding an entire agreement as invalid or unenforceable when other parts of it were clear enough for interpretation. Ultimately, Justice Field concluded his dissent by stating his belief that contracts are sacred obligations which must be respected by all parties involved regardless of their individual interpretations or opinions on how they ought to be interpreted or enforced.