In the case of William J. Slicer, Lawrence Slicer, William Cromwell Slicer and Marcella Slicer v The Bank of Pittsburgh, appellants argued that they were entitled to a portion of funds held by the bank as security for debts owed by their father. They claimed that these funds should be divided among them in accordance with Virginia law which provided for such division when a parent died intestate (without leaving a will). The Supreme Court disagreed and ruled against the appellants on grounds that Virginia law did not apply since it was superseded by an act passed in 1841 which stated that all creditors must receive equal payment from any assets left behind after death. This ruling established precedent whereby state laws are overridden if there is federal legislation covering similar matters.

In the dissenting opinion of this case, Justice Catron argued that the Bank of Pittsburgh had a right to collect on its debt from William J. Slicer and his family despite their claim that they were not liable for it due to an alleged lack of consideration. He reasoned that since there was no evidence presented in court showing any fraud or mistake by the bank, then they should be allowed to recover what is owed them as per contract law. Furthermore, he stated that even if there was some sort of irregularity in how the loan agreement came about between Slicer and the bank, it did not necessarily mean that all parties involved would be absolved from their contractual obligations under such circumstances. Therefore, Justice Catron concluded by asserting his belief that justice demanded judgment for The Bank of Pittsburgh against William J. Slicer and his family so long as no proof could be found indicating otherwise.