In the case of Smith v. Murray, 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a defendant's constitutional rights were not violated when his attorney chose not to present certain mitigating evidence during sentencing in a capital murder trial. The court held that this decision was part of a reasonable legal strategy and did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Richard Jerald Smith had been convicted for two counts of capital murder and sentenced to death in Virginia state courts; he argued on appeal that his lawyer failed him by neglecting to introduce evidence about his troubled background which might have led jurors to choose life imprisonment over execution. However, the high court disagreed with Smith’s argument stating it as an attempt at “Monday morning quarterbacking” rather than demonstrating genuine ineffectiveness from his defense team.

In the dissenting opinion for Smith v. Murray, Justice Brennan argued that the majority's decision was a departure from established precedent regarding ineffective counsel and procedural default rules. He contended that Smith's trial lawyer had failed to provide effective assistance by not investigating or presenting evidence of his client’s mental health during sentencing, which could have potentially mitigated his punishment. Furthermore, he criticized the majority for applying an overly rigid interpretation of procedural default rules in order to deny Smith federal habeas review on this claim. According to him, such strict application contradicted previous rulings where exceptions were made when fundamental fairness required it - as he believed was true in this case given its life-or-death stakes. Thus, Justice Brennan disagreed with denying Smith relief based on technicalities rather than addressing substantive issues concerning fair representation and just punishment.