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08-724 SMITH V. SPISAK DECISION BELOW: 512 F.3d 852 CERT. GRANTED 2/23/2009 QUESTION PRESENTED: 1. Did the Sixth Circuit contravene the directives of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") and Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006), when it applied Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), to resolve in a habeas petitioner's favor questions that were not decided or addressed in Mills? 2. Did the Sixth Circuit exceed its authority under AEDPA when it applied United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), to presume that a habeas petitioner suffered prejudice from several allegedly deficient statements made by his trial counsel during closing argument instead of deferring to the Ohio Supreme Court's reasonable rejection of the claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 03-4034
In the case of Keith Smith, Warden v. Frank G. Spisak Jr., 2009, the U.S Supreme Court ruled in favor of Smith and reversed a decision by the Sixth Circuit Court that had granted habeas corpus relief to Spisak. The court held that any errors made during jury instructions or closing arguments did not have substantial impact on Spisak's sentencing outcome. Frank G. Spisak Jr., who was convicted for multiple murders at Cleveland State University in Ohio, argued his counsel’s ineffective assistance led to an unfair trial and death sentence due to inappropriate comments about his guilt and failure to present mitigating evidence properly during penalty phase proceedings. However, the Supreme Court found no reasonable probability that but for these alleged errors, result would have been different given overwhelming aggravating factors presented against him.
In the dissenting opinion for Keith Smith, Warden v. Frank G. Spisak Jr., Justice Stevens argued that the majority's decision was based on a misinterpretation of precedent and an overemphasis on procedural rules at the expense of substantive justice. He contended that Spisak’s attorney had failed to provide effective assistance during sentencing by emphasizing his client's negative traits rather than mitigating factors, which could have potentially spared him from death penalty. Furthermore, he criticized the majority for applying a standard of review that gave too much deferity to state court decisions without adequately considering whether those decisions were reasonable applications of clearly established federal law as determined by Supreme Court precedents.