Term: 2006
Docket: 05-11304
Laroyce Lathair Smith v. Texas
- Pro
05-11304 SMITH V. TEXAS DECISION BELOW:185 S.W. 3d 455 CERT. GRANTED 10/6/2006 QUESTIONS PRESENTED: I. In Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004), this Court summarily reversed the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and found constitutional error under Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.302 (1989) (Penry I), and Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (Penry II). Is it consistent with this Court’s remand in this case for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to deem the error in petitioner’s case harmless based on its view that jurors were in fact able to give adequate consideration and effect to petitioner’s mitigating evidence notwithstanding this Court’s conclusion to the contrary? II. Can the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, based on a procedural determination that it declined to adopt in its original decision that this Court then summarily reversed, impose on remand a daunting standard of harm (“egregious harm”) to the constitutional violation found by this Court? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: AP-74228
In the case of LaRoyce Lathair Smith v. Texas, 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Smith, a death row inmate who argued that his sentencing was unfair due to improper jury instructions. The court found that jurors were not properly informed about how they could consider mitigating evidence - information which might have persuaded them to impose a life sentence instead of death penalty. This decision followed an earlier ruling by the same court in 2004 where it had ordered Texas' highest criminal court to reconsider its affirmation of Smith's death sentence for similar reasons but was ignored by lower courts on remand. In this second review, however, SCOTUS held that such disregard constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and reversed the judgment.
In the dissenting opinion for the case of LaRoyce Lathair Smith v. Texas, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas, argued that there was no constitutional violation in Smith's sentencing. They contended that the jury had been adequately informed about how to consider mitigating evidence during their deliberations on his sentence. The dissenting justices believed that it was not necessary for jurors to be explicitly told they could give "full effect" to such evidence when determining whether a death sentence should be imposed or not. Furthermore, they disagreed with the majority's interpretation of previous Supreme Court rulings on this issue; instead arguing those cases did not establish an absolute requirement for specific instructions regarding mitigating circumstances in capital punishment trials.
