In Snyder v. Massachusetts, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1933 that a defendant's rights were not violated when he was excluded from a jury view of crime scenes during his trial for murder. The court held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee "the privilege of presence at all stages of his trial." The case involved Robert E. Snyder who had been convicted for first-degree murder and sentenced to death by electrocution in Massachusetts state court after being denied permission to accompany the jury on its visit to inspect locations relevant to his case. In an 8-1 decision, Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo wrote for the majority stating that while due process guarantees fairness, it does not assure "unfettered discretion" or absolute rights but rather those fundamental principles which are “implicit in ordered liberty.” Thus, excluding Snyder from accompanying jurors did not violate any principle of justice so rooted in tradition and conscience as to be ranked as fundamental.

In the dissenting opinion for Snyder v. Massachusetts, Justice Cardozo argued that the defendant's constitutional rights were violated when he was not allowed to be present during a jury view of crime scene evidence. He contended that this exclusion constituted an infringement on his right to confront witnesses and evidence against him, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Furthermore, he asserted that it denied him due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because it prevented him from fully participating in his own defense. The majority ruling held that such views are not critical stages of trial where presence is required; however, Cardozo disagreed with this interpretation and believed any part of proceedings potentially influencing a jury’s decision should mandate defendant’s presence.