In Spencer v. McDougal, the U.S Supreme Court ruled on a dispute over land ownership in Oregon. The plaintiff, Spencer, claimed that he had acquired rights to the disputed property through preemption under federal law before it was included within an Indian reservation by executive order. However, when the reservation was later reduced in size and opened for settlement again under public domain laws, McDougal obtained title to this same piece of land from the government. The court held that even if Spencer's claim were true (which they did not definitively rule on), his rights would have been extinguished when the land became part of an Indian reservation because such reservations are "withdrawn from sale or other disposal" under public domain laws until officially restored to it by Congress or Presidential proclamation. Therefore, since McDougal received valid title after its restoration to public lands status and there is no provision allowing preemptive claims like Spencer's during periods of withdrawal as a reserve; he could not now assert superior right against him.

In the dissenting opinion for Spencer v. McDougal, it was argued that the majority's decision to uphold a lower court ruling in favor of McDougal was incorrect because it failed to consider important aspects of contract law. The dissenting justices believed that there were significant issues with how the original agreement between Spencer and McDougal had been interpreted by both the trial court and their colleagues on the Supreme Court bench. They contended that certain terms within this agreement were not sufficiently clear or specific enough to be legally binding, thus rendering any claim based upon them null and void. Furthermore, they disagreed with their peers' interpretation of evidence presented during earlier proceedings, arguing instead that these materials supported Spencer's case rather than undermining it as others had suggested. Ultimately, they felt strongly enough about these perceived errors in judgement to formally register their disagreement with what would become official legal precedent.