In the case of Samuel Sprigg vs. The Bank of Mount Pleasant, appellant Samuel Sprigg brought a suit against appellee The Bank of Mount Pleasant for breach of contract and conversion. At issue was whether or not the bank had wrongfully converted funds from an account held by Sprigg in order to pay off debts owed by him to other parties. In its decision, the Supreme Court found that while there were some errors made on both sides, ultimately it was determined that no conversion occurred as all payments made out of his account were done so with his knowledge and consent. Furthermore, any damages incurred due to negligence on behalf of either party would have been limited only to those which could be proven at trial; however since neither side presented sufficient evidence in this regard during their arguments before the court, they did not receive any compensation for such losses. As a result, judgment was rendered in favor of The Bank Of Mount Pleasant and against Samuel Sprigg's claim for relief

In the case of Samuel Sprigg vs. The Bank of Mount Pleasant, the dissenting opinion argued that a bank's right to sue for debt should not be limited by state law. The majority had held that such suits were subject to limitations set out in Maryland statutes, but Justice McLean disagreed with this ruling and argued instead that banks have an inherent right to bring suit against their debtors without being bound by any statute or other limitation. He noted that if banks could not enforce their contracts through legal action then they would be unable to protect themselves from fraud and dishonesty on the part of borrowers who might otherwise take advantage of them. Furthermore, he reasoned that since banking is a legitimate business activity it should enjoy all rights granted under common law just like any other profession or trade. In conclusion, Justice McLean believed strongly in upholding contractual obligations between parties regardless of whether those obligations are enforced through statutory means or common law principles; thus he dissented from the majority opinion which sought to limit a bank's ability to seek redress for unpaid debts via court proceedings.