The U.S. Supreme Court case St. Louis Malleable Casting Company v. George C. Prendergast Construction Company in 1922 revolved around a dispute over the payment for goods delivered under a contract between the two parties involved, specifically whether or not there was an implied warranty of quality and fitness for purpose on part of the supplier (St. Louis Malleable Casting Co.). The court ruled that no such warranty existed unless explicitly stated in their agreement, as it is not automatically assumed within every sales contract according to Missouri law which governed this particular transaction. In this case, Prendergast had purchased castings from St.Louis Malleable but later refused to pay claiming they were defective and unfit for use in construction work due to poor quality iron used by St.Louis Malleable during manufacturing process. However, since there was no explicit guarantee about product's suitability included within their contractual terms at time of sale; nor any evidence presented suggesting that seller knew buyer would be using these items specifically for building purposes - thus requiring higher standard materials than what might otherwise have been acceptable - court found against plaintiff (Prendergast) and ordered them to fulfill original payment obligations towards defendant (St.Louis).

In the dissenting opinion for the case of St. Louis Malleable Casting Company v. George C. Prendergast Construction Company, it was argued that there was a lack of sufficient evidence to support the majority's decision in favor of Prendergast Construction Company. The dissenting justices believed that St. Louis Malleable Casting had met its contractual obligations and should not be held liable for damages resulting from alleged defects in materials provided by them under their contract with Prendergast Construction Company because they were not given an opportunity to inspect or remedy any potential issues before installation took place, as stipulated by their agreement terms. They also disagreed with the interpretation of "merchantability" used by the majority, arguing instead that this term refers only to whether goods are fit for ordinary purposes rather than specific ones unless explicitly stated otherwise in a contract.