In the case of State Bank v. St. Louis Rail Fastening Company, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to determine whether a state bank could sue a corporation in a federal court. The case arose when the State Bank of Missouri sued the St. Louis Rail Fastening Company in a federal court for the recovery of a debt. The St. Louis Rail Fastening Company argued that the state bank was not a citizen of Missouri and therefore could not sue in a federal court. The Supreme Court held that the state bank was a citizen of Missouri and could sue in a federal court. The Court reasoned that the state bank was a citizen of the state in which it was incorporated and that it was not necessary for the state bank to be a citizen of the state in which it was located. The Court also held that the state bank was a citizen of the United States and could sue in a federal court. The Court's decision in this case established that state banks are citizens of the state in which they are incorporated and can sue in a federal court. This decision has been cited in numerous cases since then and has been used to support the idea that state banks have the same rights as other citizens of the United States.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in State Bank v. St. Louis Rail Fastening Company, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to an unjust result for creditors of insolvent corporations. He argued that under prior decisions of this Court, a creditor could not be barred from recovering its debt due simply because it had accepted stock certificates as payment instead of cash or other property with actual value at the time of acceptance. The majority's ruling would allow such a bar on recovery if those stock certificates were later found to have no value when presented for redemption by their issuer - even though they may have been worth something at the time they were received by the creditor in satisfaction of its debt claim against an insolvent corporation. Justice Field concluded his dissent noting that while he agreed with much of what was said in support of reversing judgment below, he felt compelled to disagree with any holding which might prevent creditors from collecting debts owed them justly and legally due regardless whether paid in money or otherwise valuable consideration like stocks or bonds issued by solvent companies but rendered worthless through subsequent mismanagement or frauds committed upon shareholders after issuance.