Stevens v. Fuller was a Supreme Court case decided in 1891. The case involved a dispute between two parties over a contract for the sale of a steamboat. The plaintiff, Stevens, had contracted to purchase the steamboat from the defendant, Fuller, for $2,000. However, Fuller refused to deliver the boat, claiming that Stevens had failed to make the payments as agreed. Stevens then sued Fuller for breach of contract. The Supreme Court held that Fuller was liable for breach of contract. The Court found that Stevens had made all the payments as agreed, and that Fuller had no legal justification for refusing to deliver the boat. The Court also held that Stevens was entitled to damages for the breach of contract, and ordered Fuller to pay Stevens the full purchase price of the steamboat. The decision in Stevens v. Fuller established the principle that a party who breaches a contract is liable for damages, and that the other party is entitled to the full purchase price of the goods or services that were the subject of the contract. This case is still cited today as an example of the legal principles governing breach of contract.

In the Supreme Court case of Stevens v. Fuller, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority’s decision was wrong and should be overturned. He believed that under the plain language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, an employer could not discriminate against an employee based on their gender identity or expression. The majority had ruled otherwise by finding that discrimination based on transgender status did not fall within Title VII's protections because it was not explicitly mentioned in its text. Justice Stevens disagreed with this interpretation and argued instead for a broader reading of Title VII to include protection from discrimination based on gender identity or expression as well as sex-based stereotypes associated with those identities and expressions. He noted how Congress had amended other civil rights laws to protect individuals from such forms of discrimination, indicating they intended for similar protections to apply under Title VII as well. Furthermore, he pointed out how courts have interpreted other statutes similarly when determining whether certain classes were protected by them—a practice known as “reading into” legislation—and thus felt it would be appropriate here too given all these factors combined together indicated Congress' intent behind passing Title VII was indeed to provide broad protection against any form of workplace discrimination regardless if it is specifically listed or not