In Stevens v. Griffith, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who had been convicted in a federal court. The petitioner, Stevens, had been convicted in a federal court of a crime and was serving his sentence in a state prison. He sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that his conviction was invalid. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who had been convicted in a federal court. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal court's judgment. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy for federal prisoners, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal court's judgment. The Court concluded that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who had been convicted in a federal court. The Court held that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal court's judgment.

In Stevens v. Griffith, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state court had jurisdiction over a case in which two parties were from different states and the dispute arose out of an alleged breach of contract. The majority opinion held that the state court did not have jurisdiction because it would be unconstitutional for one state to exercise authority over citizens of another state without their consent. Justice Harlan dissented, arguing that under Article III of the Constitution, Congress has exclusive power to regulate cases between citizens of different states and therefore there is no constitutional impediment preventing a State from exercising its own judicial powers in such matters. He further argued that if Congress had intended otherwise then they could have explicitly stated so when passing legislation on this matter; however, they chose not to do so and thus he concluded that States should retain their right to adjudicate disputes between citizens from other jurisdictions as long as those disputes arise within their borders.