Stevenson v. Williams was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The case arose when the petitioner, Stevenson, was convicted of a crime in the state of Georgia and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a federal prison. Stevenson then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the state court, arguing that his conviction was unconstitutional. The state court granted the writ and ordered Stevenson's release from federal custody. The federal government then appealed the state court's decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that the state court lacked the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Supreme Court agreed with the federal government, holding that the state court lacked the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative and that the state court lacked the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The decision in Stevenson v. Williams established that state courts lack the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners held in federal prisons. The decision also established that the writ of habeas corpus is a federal prerogative and that state courts lack the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals.

In the case of Stevenson v. Williams, Justice Field delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority had incorrectly interpreted the law and failed to consider relevant facts. He noted that under Missouri state law, an executor was not liable for debts incurred by his predecessor unless they were approved or ratified by him; as such, he believed it would be unjust to hold Stevenson responsible for any debt contracted prior to his appointment as executor. Furthermore, Field argued that even if there had been some form of ratification on behalf of Stevenson after assuming office, this should have been considered separately from any liability arising from pre-existing contracts entered into before his tenure began. In conclusion, Justice Field maintained that while Stevens may have assumed responsibility for certain liabilities upon becoming executor due to ratifying them afterwards - this did not extend back retroactively so far as those created before he took office and thus could not be held accountable in this instance.