Stewart v. Masterson was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The case arose when a prisoner, William Stewart, was held in federal custody in the state of Missouri. Stewart sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that he was being held in violation of his constitutional rights. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to detain a prisoner. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to protect the rights of its citizens. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to detain a prisoner. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to protect the rights of its citizens.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Stewart v. Masterson, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to an unjust result. He argued that under existing law, a contract for personal services could not be enforced against a third party who had no knowledge of it or involvement with it at any time prior to its breach. In this case, he contended that Masterson had no such knowledge or involvement when she purchased the property from Stewart; therefore, her title should have been respected by the court as valid and unencumbered by any claim arising out of his contract with Browning. Justice Field concluded his dissent by noting that if contracts for personal services were allowed to bind innocent purchasers like Masterson without their consent or knowledge then "the security which real estate has heretofore enjoyed will be greatly impaired."