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In the case of Marvin Stone v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 1994, Marvin Stone, a Jamaican citizen who had been living in the United States as a lawful permanent resident since 1976, was ordered to be deported by INS due to his conviction for attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal stating that he was ineligible for waiver under Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act because he had not resided continuously in the U.S. for seven years prior to committing his crime. However, Stone argued that this interpretation violated equal protection principles as it treated lawful permanent residents differently from temporary residents or illegal aliens who were eligible for relief after seven years regardless when their crimes occurred. The Supreme Court ruled against Stone's argument stating that Congress has broad power over immigration matters and can create classifications among different groups without violating equal protection principles if there is rational basis behind such classification which exists here - encouraging long-term legal residence before granting discretionary relief from deportation.
In the dissenting opinion for Marvin Stone v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, it was argued that the majority's decision to deport Stone based on his conviction of a drug-related crime was unjust because it failed to consider important factors in his case. The dissent pointed out that Stone had lived in the United States since he was a child and had strong family ties within the country, including U.S.-born children. They also noted that he had been rehabilitated from his past drug use and now led an exemplary life as a productive member of society. Furthermore, they criticized the majority's interpretation of immigration law as overly harsh and inflexible, arguing that deportation should not be automatic for any non-citizen convicted of a felony but rather should depend on individual circumstances such as those present in Stone’s case.