Stone & Others v. New Orleans & Northeastern Railroad Company is a United States Supreme Court case from 1885. The case involved a dispute between the New Orleans & Northeastern Railroad Company and the Stone family, who owned land adjacent to the railroad. The railroad had been built on land that was originally owned by the Stone family, but the family had sold the land to the railroad in 1876. The Stones argued that the railroad had not paid them the full amount of money that was due for the land, and they sought to recover the difference. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Stone family, finding that the railroad had not paid the full amount due for the land. The Court held that the railroad was liable for the difference between the amount paid and the amount due, and that the Stones were entitled to recover the difference. The Court also held that the railroad was liable for any damages caused by its failure to pay the full amount due. This case established the principle that a party who purchases land from another party is liable for any difference between the amount paid and the amount due.

In Stone & Others v. New Orleans & Northeastern Railroad Company, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state-created corporation could be sued in federal court for violating the rights of individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Harlan delivered a dissenting opinion arguing that Congress had not given federal courts jurisdiction over such cases and that it should remain with state courts. He argued that allowing suits against corporations created by states would interfere with their sovereignty and ability to regulate their own affairs without interference from other governments or entities. Furthermore, he noted that if Congress wanted to give federal courts jurisdiction over these types of cases, they should have done so explicitly rather than leaving it up to interpretation by judges who may not understand all aspects of state law or policy considerations involved in creating such corporations. Ultimately, Justice Harlan concluded that this case did not fall within any category where Congress had granted authority for federal court intervention and thus his dissent was based on an understanding of congressional intent as well as respect for states’ rights when it comes to regulating corporate activity within their borders.