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In the case of James R. Stringer v. Lee Roy Black, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections et al., 1991, the U.S Supreme Court examined whether a state prisoner who had been denied habeas corpus relief in state court could seek federal habeas review without first appealing to the highest state court. The petitioner, James R. Stringer was convicted for capital murder and sentenced to death in Mississippi State Court but failed to appeal his conviction and sentence within time limits set by Mississippi law due to ineffective assistance from his counsel during post-conviction proceedings. Stringer then sought federal habeas corpus relief arguing that he received ineffective assistance at both trial and sentencing phases which violated his Sixth Amendment rights under Strickland v Washington (1984). However, this petition was dismissed as an abuse of writ because it raised claims not presented in earlier petitions. The Supreme Court held that since there were no clear procedural rules regarding exhaustion requirement when a claim has been procedurally defaulted due to attorney error during post-conviction proceedings at the time Stringer filed his initial federal petition; therefore he should be allowed another opportunity for federal review on these grounds.
In the dissenting opinion for James R. Stringer v. Lee Roy Black, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections et al., Justice Scalia argued that the majority's decision to remand the case back to state court was inappropriate and inconsistent with precedent. He contended that federal courts should not interfere in state proceedings unless there is a clear violation of constitutional rights or federal law, neither of which he believed were present in this case. Furthermore, he criticized the majority for creating an unnecessary new standard for evaluating jury instructions on mitigating circumstances during sentencing phases in capital cases - a standard he felt would only lead to further confusion and litigation without providing any real benefit or clarity to defendants or courts alike.