In the case of Swanson v. Sears, 1911, the United States Supreme Court ruled on a dispute involving land ownership in Minnesota. The plaintiff, Swanson, claimed that he had purchased a piece of property from an individual who had obtained it through a patent issued by the U.S government under railroad grant acts. However, defendant Sears argued that this patent was invalid because at the time it was issued (in 1866), Congress had already revoked any unclaimed lands under these acts and returned them to public domain for settlement purposes only. The court sided with Sears and held that once Congress withdrew these lands from railroad grants and restored them to public domain status in 1857; they could not be patented for railway purposes thereafter even if they were located within indemnity limits of original grant. Therefore, since person from whom Swanson bought his land received his title via such an improperly issued patent; he did not have valid claim to convey onto others including Swanson himself. This decision underscored importance of understanding historical context when interpreting laws related to federal land grants as well as potential pitfalls associated with purchasing properties whose titles are derived from such sources.

The dissenting opinion in Swanson v. Sears argued that the majority's decision to uphold a lower court ruling, which found in favor of Sears and against Swanson on the grounds of contract law, was incorrect. The dissenters believed that there were significant issues with how the original contract between Swanson and Sears had been interpreted by both the trial court and now by their fellow justices. They contended that certain provisions within this agreement had not been given due consideration during deliberations, leading to an unjust outcome for Mr. Swanson who they felt should have prevailed based on his claims under said contractual terms. Furthermore, they disagreed with their colleagues' interpretation of relevant case law as applied to these specific circumstances; arguing instead for a different reading which would support overturning rather than affirming the previous judgment.