In the Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 1960, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled on a case involving antitrust law and exclusive dealing contracts. The issue at hand was whether an exclusive 20-year coal supply contract between Tampa Electric Company (TECO) and Nashville Coal violated Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits sales conditions that may substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly in any line of commerce. TECO had agreed to purchase all its coal requirements from Nashville for two decades, covering about half of one percent of national bituminous coal production annually during this period. The court held that such long-term agreements did not inherently violate antitrust laws unless they could be shown to have anti-competitive effects within a relevant market area; it found no substantial evidence indicating such impact in this case. Therefore, it concluded that there was no violation under Section 3 as these contracts didn't pose significant threats to competition nor were likely to create monopolies.

In the dissenting opinion for Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, argued that the majority's decision to limit antitrust scrutiny only to those contracts which cover a "substantial" portion of an entire market was misguided. They contended that such a rule could potentially allow monopolistic practices in smaller markets or sectors within larger industries to go unchecked, undermining the purpose of antitrust laws. The dissenters also disagreed with the majority's interpretation of what constitutes a 'requirements contract,' arguing that it should not be limited solely to situations where one party agrees to buy all its requirements from another party but should include any agreement where one party commits itself for an extended period not to deal with competitors of another party.