In Taylor & Another v. Bemiss & Others by their Next Friend, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a state court had the authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus to a person who was being held in custody in another state. The case involved a dispute between two parties in the state of Virginia. The plaintiff, Taylor, was a resident of Virginia and was being held in custody in the state of Maryland. The defendant, Bemiss, was a resident of Maryland and was seeking to have Taylor released from custody in Maryland. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus to a person who was being held in custody in another state. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that was available only in the state where the person was being held in custody. The Court further held that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the custody of a person in another state. The Court's decision in this case established the principle that a state court does not have the authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus to a person who is being held in custody in another state. This principle has been applied in numerous cases since then and has been an important part of the law of habeas corpus.

In Taylor & Another v. Bemiss & Others by their Next Friend, the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether a state court had jurisdiction over an action brought against non-residents of that state. The majority held that the lower court did have such jurisdiction, but Justice Field dissented from this opinion and argued that it violated due process for a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over individuals who were not present in or doing business within its borders. He reasoned that since these defendants had no connection with the forum other than being sued there, they could not be expected to know about any legal proceedings taking place in another state and thus should not be bound by them. Furthermore, he noted how allowing states to exercise unlimited personal jurisdiction would lead to oppressive results as it would allow plaintiffs from one state “to hale persons into distant tribunals” without giving those persons sufficient notice or opportunity for defense. Thus, Justice Field concluded his dissent by arguing that due process requires some limits on when a court can assert personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants and urged the Court to reconsider its decision accordingly.