In Telfener v. Russ, the U.S Supreme Court dealt with a dispute over land ownership in Texas between an Italian company and American citizens. The Italian company, represented by Telfener, claimed that they had purchased the land from the State of Texas for railroad construction purposes under an 1876 law granting lands to railway companies. However, before this purchase was made official through patenting (a legal process confirming sale), several individuals including Russ had settled on parts of this land believing it to be public domain. When these settlers were sued for trespassing by Telfener's group after patent issuance in 1881, they argued that their settlement rights should have been recognized as per preemption laws which allowed settlers on public lands to acquire title against later purchasers like railroads if certain conditions were met. The court ruled in favor of the settlers stating that although technically speaking patents issued after settlements would usually hold precedence over settler claims according to federal law; however due to specific language used within Texan legislation regarding such matters at that time - namely its failure explicitly state or imply any intent override existing federal preemption laws - those laws remained applicable thus protecting settler rights even post-patent issuance.

In the dissenting opinion for Telfener v. Russ, Justice Brewer argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with previous rulings and failed to uphold principles of equity. He contended that a contract existed between parties involved in constructing a railroad, which should have been honored despite any subsequent changes in circumstances or law. The fact that one party had already performed their part of the agreement by building sections of track made it unjust to allow another party to avoid their obligations simply because they no longer wished to proceed with construction due to changed conditions. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Texas law regarding land grants for railroads, asserting instead that such laws were intended as incentives rather than absolute requirements for obtaining land rights. In his view, this misinterpretation led them wrongly conclude there was no enforceable contract between parties when indeed there was.