Terry v. Abraham et al. was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The case arose when a prisoner, John Terry, was held in federal custody in the state of Ohio. Terry sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that he was being held in violation of the Constitution. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority in this matter. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's exercise of this right. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority in this matter.

In Terry v. Abraham et al., the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a state court had jurisdiction to hear a case involving an alleged breach of contract between two parties, one from Ohio and one from Michigan. The majority opinion held that the state court did not have jurisdiction because it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant who resided in Michigan. Justice Field dissented, arguing that since both parties were citizens of different states when they entered into their agreement, then under Article III Section 2 Clause 1 of the Constitution (the Diversity Clause), federal courts would have exclusive original jurisdiction over any disputes arising out of this contract dispute. He further argued that if Congress had intended for state courts to exercise concurrent or supplemental authority in such cases, it would have done so explicitly through legislation rather than leaving it up to judicial interpretation.