In the 1913 case Tevis v. Ryan, the United States Supreme Court dealt with a dispute over land ownership in California. The plaintiff, Tevis, claimed that he had purchased a piece of property from an individual who had received it through inheritance. However, Ryan contested this claim and argued that she was the rightful owner as she was also an heir to the original owner's estate. The lower court ruled in favor of Ryan based on her argument that there were errors in how the property title was transferred to Tevis' seller which invalidated his purchase. The Supreme Court reversed this decision after examining California state law regarding real estate transactions and inheritances. They found no evidence supporting Ryan's claims about procedural mistakes during transfer of ownership or any legal reason why these alleged errors would nullify subsequent sales of inherited land. Therefore, they concluded that under applicable laws at both state and federal levels, once someone inherits property they have full rights to sell it regardless if other potential heirs disagree or believe themselves more deserving for personal reasons such as being closer relatives etc., unless there is clear proof showing fraud involved when making transaction between parties involved (which wasn't present here). Thus ruling favored towards Mr.Tevis asserting him as legitimate owner.

In the dissenting opinion for Tevis v. Ryan, Justice Holmes disagreed with the majority's decision to uphold a Kentucky statute that allowed creditors to seize debtors' property without prior notice or hearing. He argued that this law violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause because it deprived individuals of their property without due process of law. Holmes believed that such seizures should only be permitted after giving debtors an opportunity to contest them in court. He also criticized the majority for failing to adequately consider whether other less intrusive means could effectively protect creditors' interests while preserving debtors' rights. Thus, he contended that by upholding this statute, the Court was endorsing an overly broad and unjust interpretation of states’ power at expense of individual liberties guaranteed under Constitution.