In Texas & Pacific Railway Company v. Kirk, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a railroad company could be held liable for damages caused by a train accident. The plaintiff, Kirk, was injured when a train operated by the defendant, Texas & Pacific Railway Company, collided with a wagon he was driving. Kirk sued the railroad company for damages, arguing that the company was negligent in its operation of the train. The Supreme Court held that the railroad company was liable for the accident. The Court reasoned that the company had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the operation of its trains, and that it had breached this duty by failing to take proper precautions to avoid the accident. The Court also held that the company was liable for the damages caused by the accident, even though the company had not been negligent in its operation of the train. The Court's decision in this case established that railroad companies can be held liable for damages caused by their trains, even if they were not negligent in their operation of the trains. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases involving railroad companies and their liability for accidents.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Texas & Pacific Railway Company v. Kirk, arguing that the majority's decision was incorrect and should be reversed. He argued that under the law of Texas, a railroad company had no right to take possession of land without first obtaining permission from its owner or paying for it. The Court had held otherwise, finding that since there was no express prohibition against taking such action in state statutes or common law, then it could not be prohibited by implication either. Justice Field disagreed with this reasoning and asserted instead that if an act is wrong and injurious to another party then it must necessarily be prohibited even if there is no explicit statute prohibiting it; he further noted that when a court finds itself unable to find any authority on point one way or another then they ought to err on the side of caution rather than allowing an act which may cause harm simply because there is nothing explicitly forbidding it. In conclusion, Justice Field believed strongly enough in his argument as to dissent from the majority opinion despite being outnumbered four-to-one by his colleagues on this case.