In the 1980 case Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the U.S Supreme Court clarified the burden of proof in employment discrimination cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff, Noreen Burdine, alleged that her employer, Texas Department of Community Affairs (TDCA), had discriminated against her based on sex by denying her a promotion and subsequently terminating her employment. The court held that once an employee has established a prima facie case for discrimination — showing they belong to a protected class, were qualified for their job or promotion but were rejected in favor thereof someone not from their protected group — it is then up to the employer to provide a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions. If such reason is provided by employer successfully rebutting presumption raised by prima facie case , then plaintiff must have opportunity to prove given explanation was merely pretextual i.e., cover-up for discriminatory action . This decision thus set out clear guidelines regarding shifting burdens of production and persuasion in Title VII cases.

In the dissenting opinion for Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, Justice Marshall argued that the majority's decision placed an unfair burden on plaintiffs in discrimination cases. He contended that once a plaintiff has made a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant should bear both the burden of production and persuasion to prove non-discriminatory intent. By requiring only a "burden of production" from defendants (i.e., merely providing another plausible reason for their actions), he believed it unfairly shifted back onto plaintiffs the difficult task of proving discriminatory intent - something they are often ill-equipped to do given their limited access to evidence compared with defendants. This approach, he feared, would undermine Title VII’s purpose: eradicating workplace discrimination.