Texas, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

Questions presented

SCOTUS records, cert granted 15 Oct 2013

1. In the course of a series of regulatory actions taken by the Environmental Protection Agency subsequent to Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), the Agency decided that a particular Clean Air Act program regulating "stationary sources," the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program, must apply to greenhouse gases, as a matter of a Chevron "step- one" mandate, once the Agency regulated "mobile-source" greenhouse-gas emissions. The Agency referred to this as the "automatic triggering" of PSD greenhouse-gas regulation. In the EPA's view, the matter turned on the meaning of the term "any air pollutant" in the PSD provisions governing those emitters required to seek permits, i.e., any "major emitting facility." 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a), 7479(1) (2013). By longstanding regulations, the Agency had defined "any air pollutant" to include any air pollutant "sub-ject to regulation" under any other part of the Act -- hence the "automatic triggering" once mobile sources were regulated. As part of a consolidated judgment addressing multiple challenges to the various Agency actions involved, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld EPA's action. The questions presented are:
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that regulating stationary-source greenhouse-gas emissions under the Clean Air Act's Prevention of Significant Deterioration program, and an associated program known as "Title V," is statutorily required as a matter of a Chevron "step-one" legislative command.
3. Whether, in determining that the Clean Air Act unambiguously requires application of the PSD program to greenhouse gases, the Court of Appeals and the EPA ignored required elements of statutory construction in cases of this type by failing to examine whether the various statutory components of that program were contradicted, nullified, or otherwise contravened by application to greenhouse gases, and, further, without considering whether alternative mechanisms exist for regulating stationary-source greenhouse-gas emissions under the Act that better serve the statute's dual concerns with the economy and the environment.
4. Whether a claimant may be barred from asserting a claim that applying the PSD program to greenhouse gases is not authorized by the Act because the claimant, or other large emitters of conventional pollutants, did not assert that claim at the time EPA promulgated decades-old regulations that involved conventional pollutants only, when, first, the claim at issue is uniquely and entirely limited to the application of the statute to greenhouse gases, and, second, the Agency, in any event, itself has modified the regulations to reflect a unique greenhouse-gas--specific definition of the key statutory term.

Opinion summary

Etalia.ai summary of the majority opinion

The case involved a challenge by Texas and other petitioners against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regarding its authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act. The central issue was whether the EPA's interpretation of its regulatory powers, particularly concerning stationary sources like power plants and factories, was consistent with congressional intent. The Supreme Court examined if the EPA could require permits for certain facilities based solely on their greenhouse gas emissions. Ultimately, while affirming some aspects of the EPA’s regulatory approach, such as regulating carbon dioxide from vehicles leading to regulation at stationary sources that emit over statutory thresholds, it limited others. Specifically, it ruled that smaller facilities emitting below those thresholds should not be subject to permitting requirements purely due to their greenhouse gas emissions unless they were already regulated for other pollutants.