This Supreme Court case involved a dispute between the Steam Ship Belgenland and its master, Theodore Jensen. The Belgenland was a Belgian vessel that had been chartered by the United States government to transport troops and supplies during the Spanish-American War. The Belgenland was damaged while in the service of the United States, and the government sought to recover the cost of repairs from Jensen. Jensen argued that he was not liable for the damages, as he had acted in accordance with the orders of the United States government. The Supreme Court held that Jensen was not liable for the damages, as he had acted in accordance with the orders of the United States government. The Court reasoned that Jensen had acted in good faith and had not been negligent in his duties. Furthermore, the Court held that the United States government was responsible for the damages, as it had chartered the vessel and was responsible for its safe operation. The Court concluded that Jensen was not liable for the damages, and the United States government was responsible for the cost of repairs.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in this case. He argued that the court should not have granted a writ of error to review the decision of the Circuit Court, as there was no substantial federal question involved. The dispute arose from an agreement between two parties regarding wages due for services rendered on board a foreign vessel while it was docked in New York harbor. Justice Field noted that such disputes were traditionally within state jurisdiction and did not involve any questions of federal law or policy; thus, he believed that granting a writ of error would be inappropriate and unnecessary. Furthermore, he contended that even if there had been some issue involving federal law at stake, it could have been addressed by other means without resorting to Supreme Court review. In conclusion, Justice Field maintained that allowing this case to proceed before the Supreme Court set an undesirable precedent which undermined its limited role as arbiter only when necessary constitutional issues are presented for adjudication.