The Daniel Ball was a landmark Supreme Court case that established the scope of the federal government's power to regulate interstate commerce. The case involved a steamboat owned by Daniel Ball, which was used to transport passengers and goods between New York and Connecticut. The steamboat was inspected by the federal government and found to be in violation of the Steamboat Act of 1852, which required all steamboats to be inspected and certified by the federal government. Ball argued that the federal government had no authority to regulate interstate commerce, and that the Steamboat Act was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the federal government, holding that the federal government had the power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The Court held that the federal government had the power to regulate the safety of steamboats, and that the Steamboat Act was a valid exercise of that power. The Court also held that the federal government had the power to regulate other aspects of interstate commerce, such as the transportation of goods and passengers. The Daniel Ball case established the scope of the federal government's power to regulate interstate commerce, and it has been cited in numerous subsequent cases involving the regulation of interstate commerce. The case is still cited today as an important precedent in the area of federal regulation of interstate commerce.

In the case of The Daniel Ball, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a federal statute which allowed for steamboats to be registered in one state and then used on waters of other states violated the Constitution. Justice Field delivered a dissenting opinion arguing that Congress had exceeded its power by passing such legislation. He argued that it was not within their authority to regulate commerce between different states as this would interfere with each state's right to control its own internal affairs. Furthermore, he noted that while Congress could pass laws regulating navigation on navigable rivers, they did not have the power to grant exclusive privileges or immunities from local regulations. As such, he concluded that allowing vessels registered in one state but operated in another constituted an unconstitutional interference with each state’s sovereignty over its own waterways and thus should be struck down as invalid.