The Dexter was a case heard by the United States Supreme Court in 1875. The case involved a dispute between the owners of the schooner Dexter and the owners of the schooner Mary. The owners of the Dexter claimed that the Mary had collided with their vessel, causing damage to the Dexter. The owners of the Mary denied any responsibility for the collision and argued that the Dexter was solely responsible for the damage. The Supreme Court held that the owners of the Mary were liable for the damage to the Dexter. The Court reasoned that the Mary had failed to keep a proper lookout and had failed to take proper precautions to avoid the collision. The Court also held that the owners of the Mary were liable for the damage to the Dexter even though the Mary had not been negligent in the collision. The Court reasoned that the Mary had a duty to take reasonable precautions to avoid a collision and that the owners of the Mary had failed to do so. The Court also held that the owners of the Dexter were not liable for the damage to the Mary. The Court reasoned that the Dexter had taken reasonable precautions to avoid the collision and that the owners of the Dexter had not been negligent in the collision. The Court also held that the owners of the Dexter were not liable for the damage to the Mary even though the Dexter had been negligent in the collision.

In the case of The Dexter, Chief Justice Waite delivered a dissenting opinion. He argued that the majority's decision was based on an incorrect interpretation of the law and would lead to unjust results. He stated that under maritime law, when goods are shipped from one port to another in foreign commerce, they become subject to local laws at their destination port. In this case, he argued that since the goods were destined for a Mexican port and had not yet arrived there when they were seized by US authorities, then Mexican law should have applied instead of US federal admiralty jurisdiction. Furthermore, he noted that even if US admiralty jurisdiction did apply in this situation it should be limited only to cases where property is actually found within its territorial waters or those belonging to other nations with whom it has treaties granting such rights; otherwise any vessel could be seized anywhere on international waters without due process or legal justification. Therefore Chief Justice Waite concluded his dissent by stating that while he agreed with some aspects of the majority opinion regarding salvage claims and lien rights over cargo shipments which had already been brought into American ports before seizure occurred; however these principles do not extend beyond them as suggested by his colleagues’ ruling in this particular instance