The Steam Tug Clara Clarita v. August M. Cox et al was a case heard by the United States Supreme Court in 1875. The case involved a dispute between the owners of the Clara Clarita, a steam tug, and the owners of the schooner, the Mary E. Smith. The Clara Clarita had been hired to tow the Mary E. Smith from New York to Philadelphia. During the voyage, the Clara Clarita collided with another vessel, the schooner, the William H. Smith. The owners of the Mary E. Smith sued the owners of the Clara Clarita for damages caused by the collision. The Supreme Court held that the owners of the Clara Clarita were liable for the damages caused by the collision. The Court found that the Clara Clarita had been negligent in its navigation and that the owners of the Clara Clarita were responsible for the damages caused by the collision. The Court also held that the owners of the Clara Clarita were liable for the costs of repairing the Mary E. Smith. The Court found that the owners of the Clara Clarita had breached their contract with the owners of the Mary E. Smith by failing to exercise due care in the navigation of the Clara Clarita. The Supreme Court's decision in this case established the principle that the owners of a vessel are liable for damages caused by the negligence of the vessel's crew. The Court's decision also established that the owners of a vessel are liable for the costs of repairing a vessel that has been damaged due to the negligence of the vessel's crew. This case is still cited today as an important precedent in maritime law.

In the case of The Steam Tug Clara Clarita v. August M. Cox et al, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a tugboat owner could recover damages from another vessel for an alleged collision that occurred in navigable waters. Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion, arguing that there were sufficient facts presented to support a finding of negligence on behalf of both vessels and thus each should be held liable for their own respective negligence. He argued that under maritime law, when two vessels are involved in a collision it is presumed they have acted negligently unless one can prove otherwise; therefore he believed both parties should bear responsibility for their actions and not just one party as proposed by the majority opinion. Furthermore, Justice Field noted that even if only one vessel had been negligent then liability would still fall upon them regardless of any contributory fault or lack thereof on behalf of the other vessel due to its status as an innocent bystander with no control over what happened during the incident at hand. Ultimately his dissent concluded with him advocating for joint liability between both parties since neither could definitively prove themselves free from blame in this particular situation