In the United States Supreme Court case of The United States Appellants v. Stephen D. Fernandez and Others, the court was asked to decide whether a certain tract of land in Florida belonged to the state or to private individuals who had purchased it from Spain before Florida became part of the United States. The issue arose because when Spain ceded Florida to the U.S., they reserved title over all lands that were not yet granted by them prior to this transfer, which included those owned by Fernandez and others at issue here. After examining various documents related to Spanish law as well as other evidence presented during trial, including testimony from witnesses on both sides, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that although there was some ambiguity in how these lands should be treated under Spanish law, ultimately it was clear that they did belong exclusively to Fernandez and his co-purchasers rather than being subject again for sale by either Spain or its successor government (the U.S.). Thus he ruled in favor of Fernadez et al., affirming their ownership rights over this particular tract of land located within what is now known as St Johns County in Florida

In the United States v. Stephen D. Fernandez and Others, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a federal statute that authorized the President of the United States to grant pardons for offenses against any state law was constitutional. The majority opinion held that it was not, as such an act would be in violation of Article II Section 2 Clause 1 of the Constitution which states that only Congress has authority to make laws concerning crimes committed within a state's jurisdiction. However, Justice McLean dissented from this ruling arguing that while Congress does have exclusive power over criminal matters involving interstate commerce or those arising under national laws, they do not have exclusive control over all criminal matters occurring within a single state’s borders; rather he argued that there is nothing in either Article I or II which prevents executive clemency from being granted by either branch when appropriate circumstances exist and where no other remedy exists for certain offenses against state law. He further noted how historically presidents had exercised their powers with respect to granting pardons since George Washington’s time without objection until now and thus concluded his dissent stating “I cannot assent to so narrow construction of these great powers vested in our government."