In the United States Supreme Court case of The United States, Appellants v. Charles Seton, Appellee, the court was asked to decide whether a state law could be used to set aside a federal judgment. At issue was an 1831 judgment in favor of Charles Seton against the United States for $2,000 plus interest and costs that had been entered by a district court in Pennsylvania. Subsequently, Maryland passed legislation which purported to void all judgments rendered before January 1st 1832 unless they were paid within one year from its passage or else they would become null and void after two years from its passage. The question presented was whether this Maryland statute could be applied retroactively so as to invalidate the prior federal judgment against the government even though it had not yet been satisfied when it became effective? After considering both sides' arguments on appeal, including those related to constitutional issues such as separation of powers between states and federal governments and due process rights under Article IV Section I Clause 2 (the Full Faith & Credit Clause), ultimately the Supreme Court held that while Congress has no power over state laws concerning their own internal affairs or proceedings at common law; however here there is an exception because "a State cannot pass any act impairing obligations already contracted." Therefore since Mr. Seton's claim arose out of contract with his creditor (the U.S.) prior to enactment of said Maryland statute then he should still have recourse through legal action despite expiration date imposed by said Act -

In the case of United States v. Charles Seton, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a federal court had jurisdiction over an action brought by a state against a citizen of another state for breach of contract. The majority opinion held that such actions were not within the scope of federal judicial power and thus could not be heard in federal courts. Justice McLean dissented from this decision, arguing that Congress had granted authority to hear cases involving citizens from different states and therefore it should have been allowed in this instance as well. He argued further that if Congress did not intend for these types of cases to be heard in federal courts then they would have explicitly stated so when granting their powers under Article III Section 2 Clause 1 (the diversity clause). He concluded his dissent by stating that he believed allowing such suits would promote justice between citizens regardless of which state they resided in and ultimately benefit society as a whole.