In the United States vs. Samuel B. Stone, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state court had jurisdiction over an action brought by a citizen of another state against a resident of that same other state in which suit was originally commenced and then removed to federal court for trial. The Supreme Court held that it did not have jurisdiction because the case involved two citizens from different states and therefore fell under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, which grants original jurisdiction only to cases between citizens of different states or foreign countries. Furthermore, even if there had been diversity among parties as required by Article III, Section 2 Clause 1 (the "diversity clause"), this would still not confer upon federal courts exclusive cognizance over such controversies since Congress has no power to grant any additional authority beyond what is specifically provided for in the Constitution itself. Therefore, since neither party could invoke either constitutional provision granting exclusive cognizance in favor of their respective claims before either tribunal - i.e., both were equally barred from invoking either provision - they must resort exclusively to whatever remedies may be available within their own respective jurisdictions according to local laws and regulations governing such matters therein; thus concluding that neither forum had proper subject matter jurisdiction over this particular controversy at hand

In the case of The United States vs. Samuel B. Stone, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a state court had jurisdiction over an indictment for murder committed on board a vessel in navigable waters within its boundaries and belonging to citizens of another state. Justice McLean delivered the dissenting opinion, arguing that it is not necessary for Congress to grant exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on vessels in navigable waters; rather, states have concurrent authority to exercise such power when they are within their territorial limits. He argued that this would be consistent with other cases where states have been found to possess concurrent powers with respect to criminal prosecutions occurring within their borders regardless of any federal legislation or treaty provisions granting exclusive jurisdiction elsewhere. Furthermore, he noted that if Congress intended otherwise then it should explicitly provide so through legislation as opposed to relying upon implication from existing laws which do not address this issue directly.