This Supreme Court case involved James Todd, Thomas Warren, Tristram G. Mitchell, William C. Mitchell and Woodbury Storer as appellants against Charles Daniel as complainant and appellee. The dispute arose from a contract between the parties for the sale of land in Ohio which was signed by both parties but not delivered to either party due to an intervening bankruptcy proceeding involving one of the signatories (Storer). The court held that while delivery is generally necessary for contracts to be binding under common law principles, it may be dispensed with if there are other circumstances indicating that a contract has been formed such as when consideration has passed or where there is evidence of mutual assent between two parties regarding their obligations under a particular agreement. In this case, since consideration had already passed prior to any bankruptcy proceedings taking place and because both sides had agreed on all material terms related to the transaction at hand before any legal action was taken then it could reasonably be assumed that they intended for their agreement to remain valid even without formal delivery being made. Thus, despite no physical document having been exchanged between them both sides were still bound by its terms according to established precedent in American jurisprudence at the time

In the dissenting opinion of James Todd, Thomas Warren, Tristram G. Mitchell, William C. Mitchell and Woodbury Storer v Charles Daniel in 1842, Justice McLean argued that the lower court had erred in its decision to grant a motion for a new trial on behalf of Daniel. The original jury found that there was no evidence to support his claim against the defendants and dismissed it with prejudice; however, upon appeal by Daniel the lower court granted him a new trial despite this finding. In dissent Justice McLean argued that such an action was improper as it violated both common law principles and those established by statute which held that when a jury has rendered their verdict with prejudice then they are not subject to being overturned or changed without good cause shown from either party involved in the case. He further noted that since neither party had presented any compelling reason why such an overturning should be allowed then he felt compelled to dissent from this ruling as he believed it set dangerous precedent for future cases where juries would be unable to render their decisions without fear of them being overturned at will by higher courts regardless if they were made with prejudice or not.