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In the case of Richard F. Trest v. Burl Cain, Warden (1997), the U.S Supreme Court addressed whether a federal court could consider an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that was not raised in state courts due to procedural default. The petitioner, Richard F. Trest, had been convicted for murder and sentenced to death in Louisiana state court but claimed his trial attorney failed to present mitigating evidence during sentencing which might have resulted in a lesser sentence. However, this claim was never presented at any level of the Louisiana courts system because it was procedurally defaulted under state law as he did not raise it on direct appeal or post-conviction relief proceedings. The Fifth Circuit denied him habeas corpus relief stating that he could only overcome his procedural default by showing cause and prejudice or actual innocence; they found no such grounds existed here since there were no new facts suggesting innocence nor any external impediment preventing him from raising this issue earlier. However, upon review by the Supreme Court led by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, it held that federal courts can hear claims defaulted in state court if failure to do so would result in fundamental miscarriage of justice - meaning cases where constitutional errors probably resulted in conviction of someone actually innocent.
In the dissenting opinion for Richard F. Trest v. Burl Cain, Warden, Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's decision to remand the case back to lower courts on grounds of ineffective counsel during post-conviction proceedings. He argued that there was no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings and thus a petitioner could not claim ineffectiveness under those circumstances. Furthermore, he pointed out that even if such a right existed, it would be irrelevant because Trest had failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from his lawyer’s alleged deficiencies as required by Strickland v Washington (1984). In other words, according to Scalia's interpretation of precedent cases and laws related to habeas corpus petitions and effective assistance of counsel rights; there was no basis for granting relief based on claims about poor legal representation after conviction.