In the case of Triplett et al. v. Lowell et al., 1935, the U.S Supreme Court ruled on a dispute involving patent rights and royalties. The plaintiffs, Triplett and others, were assignees of a patent for an electrical device who had entered into a licensing agreement with the defendants, Lowell and others. Under this agreement, they received royalty payments based on sales made by licensees using their patented technology. The issue arose when some licensees began to use non-patented parts in conjunction with the patented device without paying royalties for these additional components. The plaintiffs argued that this violated their patent rights as it reduced their royalty income. However, after examining previous rulings related to patents and contracts law (including Motion Picture Patents Co v Universal Film Manufacturing Co), the court disagreed with them stating that while they could control how their invention was used through contractual agreements; they couldn't extend those controls beyond what was covered by their actual patent claim. Therefore, if someone used non-patented parts alongside or instead of certain elements within the patented device – even if it resulted in lower royalty payments – it didn't infringe upon any legal right held by Triplett et al because those extra components weren’t part of what was protected under their original patent grant.

In the dissenting opinion for Triplett et al. v. Lowell et al., Justice Stone argued that the majority's decision was a departure from established principles of equity, which traditionally allows courts to grant relief when it is necessary to prevent irreparable injury or multiplicity of suits. He contended that there was no statutory provision barring such an injunction in this case and disagreed with the majority's interpretation of relevant statutes as implicitly denying this power to federal courts. Furthermore, he pointed out that if Congress had intended such a significant change in judicial practice, they would have made it explicit rather than leaving it up to inference by the court. In his view, allowing state proceedings against taxpayers who are already involved in federal litigation over their tax liability creates unnecessary hardship and confusion without any clear benefit.