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Trust Company v. National Bank is a United States Supreme Court case that was decided in 1879. The case involved a dispute between a trust company and a national bank over the ownership of a promissory note. The trust company had purchased the note from a third party, and the national bank argued that it was the rightful owner of the note. The Supreme Court held that the trust company was the rightful owner of the note. The Court reasoned that the trust company had purchased the note in good faith and had no knowledge of any prior claims to the note. The Court also held that the national bank had failed to prove that it was the rightful owner of the note. The Court's decision established the principle that a purchaser of a promissory note in good faith is the rightful owner of the note, even if the purchaser is unaware of any prior claims to the note. This principle has been applied in numerous cases since the decision in Trust Company v. National Bank.
Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Trust Company v. National Bank, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to both precedent and sound reasoning. He argued that a national bank had no power to issue certificates of deposit or accept deposits from individuals, as this would be an exercise of trust powers which were not granted by Congress when it created such banks. Furthermore, he noted that if Congress intended for national banks to have such powers then they should have been explicitly stated in the act creating them; since they were not included, it could only be assumed that these powers did not exist and thus any attempt by a national bank to exercise them was invalid. Finally, Justice Field concluded his dissent by noting that while state laws may allow corporations other than banking institutions to engage in activities similar to those prohibited under federal law for national banks, this does not mean those same activities are permissible for federally chartered entities like the one at hand.