Trust Company v. Sedgwick was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a trust company had the right to sue a third party for damages. The case arose when the trust company, Trust Company, sued Sedgwick for damages resulting from a breach of contract. The trust company argued that it had the right to sue Sedgwick because it was a third party beneficiary of the contract between the two parties. The Supreme Court held that the trust company did not have the right to sue Sedgwick for damages. The Court reasoned that the trust company was not a party to the contract and therefore did not have the right to sue for damages. The Court further held that the trust company was not a third party beneficiary of the contract and therefore did not have the right to sue for damages. The Court's decision in Trust Company v. Sedgwick established that a trust company does not have the right to sue a third party for damages resulting from a breach of contract. The Court's decision also established that a trust company is not a third party beneficiary of a contract and therefore does not have the right to sue for damages.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Trust Company v. Sedgwick, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to a dangerous expansion of judicial power. He argued that it was not within the court's purview to determine whether or not an act of Congress is constitutional; rather, this determination should be left up to Congress itself. Furthermore, he noted that if courts were allowed to make such determinations, they could potentially interfere with congressional authority by invalidating acts passed by Congress without any legal basis for doing so. Additionally, Justice Field argued that even if there was some merit in determining constitutionality on a case-by-case basis as proposed by the majority opinion, this particular case did not present sufficient evidence for such a determination because no facts had been presented which showed how or why an act of Congress might be unconstitutional in this instance. Ultimately then Justice Field concluded his dissent stating that while he agreed with much of what had been said in favor of allowing courts greater latitude when it came to determining constitutionality issues on a case-by-case basis - especially where clear violations are evident - he felt strongly against granting them unlimited discretion over all matters related thereto due both its potential danger and lack of necessity given existing precedents already established regarding these types cases.