In Turner v. Ward, the United States Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who had been convicted in a federal court. The petitioner, Turner, had been convicted in a federal court of a crime and was serving his sentence in a state prison. He then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the state court, arguing that his conviction was unconstitutional. The state court granted the writ and ordered Turner's release. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus is a federal remedy and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with a federal conviction. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus is a remedy that is available only to those who have been convicted in a federal court. Therefore, the state court did not have the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus to Turner. The Court's decision in Turner v. Ward established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners who have been convicted in federal courts. This decision has been cited in numerous cases since then, and it remains an important precedent in the area of federal-state relations.

Justice Harlan delivered the dissenting opinion in Turner v. Ward, arguing that the majority had misapplied existing law to reach its conclusion. He argued that under prior precedent, a state court could not grant an injunction against a federal officer acting within his authority and jurisdiction unless it was necessary to protect property rights or prevent irreparable injury from occurring. In this case, he argued that there was no evidence of either of these conditions being present; therefore, the injunction should have been denied by the lower court as well as by the Supreme Court on appeal. Furthermore, Justice Harlan noted that even if such conditions were present in this case they would be insufficient grounds for granting an injunction since Congress had already provided remedies for any wrongs committed by federal officers through their own legislation and procedures which did not involve interference with official duties or proceedings before them. Therefore, he concluded that it was improper for state courts to interfere with matters over which they lacked jurisdiction and urged reversal of the decision below so as to uphold established principles regarding judicial power between states and federal government entities.