In the case of Turnpike Company v. Illinois, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether the state of Illinois had the right to revoke a charter granted to the Turnpike Company. The Turnpike Company had been granted a charter by the state of Illinois in 1851, which allowed them to construct and operate a turnpike road. The charter also granted the company certain rights and privileges, including the right to charge tolls for the use of the road. In 1867, the state of Illinois passed a law revoking the charter granted to the Turnpike Company. The Turnpike Company then brought a suit against the state of Illinois, arguing that the state had no right to revoke the charter. The Supreme Court of the United States agreed with the Turnpike Company, ruling that the state of Illinois had no right to revoke the charter. The Court held that the charter was a contract between the state and the Turnpike Company, and that the state could not revoke the charter without the consent of the Turnpike Company. The Court also held that the state of Illinois had violated the contract by revoking the charter without the consent of the Turnpike Company. As a result, the Court ruled in favor of the Turnpike Company and ordered the state of Illinois to pay damages to the Turnpike Company.

In the case of Turnpike Company v. Illinois, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether or not a state legislature had the power to revoke an act that granted a turnpike company exclusive rights over certain roads in exchange for their agreement to build and maintain them. The majority opinion held that such revocation was unconstitutional as it violated both due process and contract clauses of the Constitution. However, Justice Field dissented from this decision on two grounds: firstly, he argued that states have inherent police powers which allow them to regulate public highways; secondly, he noted that if there were any contractual obligations between the parties then they should be enforced by courts rather than legislatures. He concluded by stating his belief that "the right of eminent domain is paramount" and thus could supersede any other considerations when it comes to regulating public highways.