In the case of Unemployment Compensation Commission of Alaska et al. v. Aragon et al., 1946, the U.S Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Unemployment Compensation Commission (UCC) and against a group of commercial fishermen who had been denied unemployment benefits by the commission. The fishermen argued that they were employees under Alaska's Employment Security Act and therefore entitled to unemployment compensation when not working during off-seasons. However, according to state law at that time, independent contractors - which included commercial fisherman - were excluded from receiving such benefits. The court held that it was within UCC’s discretion to interpret ambiguous terms in its own legislation as long as their interpretation was reasonable; this is known as Chevron deference principle where courts defer to administrative agencies' interpretations unless they are unreasonable or contrary to clear congressional intent. Therefore, since UCC reasonably interpreted "independent contractor" status based on common-law agency principles excluding these workers from coverage under its act, it did not violate due process rights nor abuse its power by denying them benefits.

In the dissenting opinion for Unemployment Compensation Commission of Alaska et al. v. Aragon et al., Justice Frankfurter disagreed with the majority's interpretation that a worker could be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits due to misconduct, even if it occurred outside working hours and off company premises. He argued that such an expansive definition of "misconduct" was not in line with the purpose of unemployment compensation laws, which aim to provide temporary financial assistance to workers who lose their jobs through no fault of their own. Furthermore, he contended that this broad interpretation would give employers undue power over employees' personal lives and potentially lead to arbitrary or discriminatory decisions about benefit eligibility. Finally, he expressed concern about courts usurping legislative authority by interpreting statutes in ways not intended by lawmakers.