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20-915 UNICOLORS, INC. V. H&M HENNES & MAURITZ, L.P. DECISION BELOW: 959 F.3d 1194 LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. CERT. GRANTED 6/1/2021 QUESTION PRESENTED: 1. Did the Ninth Circuit err in breaking with its own prior precedent and the findings of other circuits and the Copyright Office in holding that 17 U.S.C. § 411 requires referral to the Copyright Office where there is no indicia of fraud or material error as to the work at issue in the subject copyright registration? 2. Did the Ninth Circuit misapply the publication standard by both applying Copyright Office requirements that were not in place at the time of registration and analyzing publication as of the date of registration as opposed to the later registration application date, and, if so, did the evidence support referral to the Copyright Office? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 18-56253, 18-56548
Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, LP was a case heard by the United States Supreme Court in 2021 regarding copyright infringement of fabric designs owned by Unicolors, Inc. The court held that when an article of clothing is made from a copyrighted fabric design without permission from the owner of the copyright, it constitutes copyright infringement even if no one can tell which particular design has been used on any given item due to its small size or because it has been altered or manipulated in some way. Furthermore, this ruling applies regardless of whether there are other similar fabrics available for purchase and regardless of how much money was spent to create the infringing garment itself. This decision will have far-reaching implications for fashion designers who rely on their copyrights to protect their unique creations from being copied without authorization and compensation.
In the case of UNICOLORS, INC v. H&M HENNES & MAURITZ, LP, Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion. She argued that the majority opinion was too broad and that it failed to consider the specific facts of the case. She argued that the majority opinion was too broad in its interpretation of the Lanham Act and that it failed to consider the specific facts of the case. She argued that the majority opinion was too broad in its interpretation of the Lanham Act and that it failed to consider the specific facts of the case. She argued that the majority opinion failed to consider the fact that the two designs at issue were not identical and that the differences between the two designs were significant. She argued that the majority opinion failed to consider the fact that the two designs at issue were not identical and that the differences between the two designs were significant. She argued that the majority opinion failed to consider the fact that the two designs at issue were not identical and that the differences between the two designs were significant. She argued that the majority opinion failed to consider the fact that the two designs at issue were not identical and that the differences between the two designs were significant. She argued that the majority opinion failed to consider the fact that the two designs at issue were not identical and that the differences between the two designs were significant. She argued that the majority opinion failed to consider the fact that the two designs at issue were not identical and that the differences between the two designs were significant. She argued that the majority opinion failed to consider the fact that the two designs at issue were not identical and that the differences between the two designs were significant. She argued that the majority opinion failed to consider the fact that the two designs at issue were not identical and that the differences between the two designs were significant. She argued that the majority opinion failed to consider the fact that the two designs at issue were not identical and that the differences between the two designs were significant. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority opinion was too broad in its interpretation of the Lanham Act and that it failed to consider the specific facts of the case. She argued that the majority opinion failed to consider the fact that the two designs at issue were not identical and that the differences between the two designs were significant. She argued that the majority opinion failed to consider the fact that the two designs at issue were not identical and that the differences between the two designs were significant. She argued that