In the 1905 case of Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Mason City and Fort Dodge Railroad Company, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a railroad company could be compelled to allow another company to use its tracks for transportation purposes. The dispute arose when Union Pacific refused to let Mason City and Fort Dodge Railroad use its bridge over the Missouri River in Omaha, Nebraska. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) had previously ruled that Union Pacific must grant access under reasonable terms as per federal law which mandated railroads provide equal facilities for interchange of traffic without discrimination or undue preference. The Supreme Court upheld ICC's decision stating that it was within their authority under the Act to Regulate Commerce (1887). It concluded that while a railroad has property rights over its infrastructure, these rights are subject to public interest considerations due to their role as common carriers engaged in interstate commerce. Therefore, they can be required by regulatory authorities like ICC to share their facilities with other companies if necessary for maintaining fair competition and ensuring efficient service provision.

In the dissenting opinion for Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Mason City and Fort Dodge Railroad Company, Justice Harlan argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with previous rulings of the court regarding railroad companies' rights to bridge tolls. He contended that under prior decisions, a railroad company could not be deprived of its right to charge reasonable rates for use of its bridges without due process. The majority's ruling effectively allowed another company to use Union Pacific’s bridge free of charge, which Harlan saw as an unjust deprivation of property rights. Furthermore, he disagreed with their interpretation that Congress had intended such a result when it passed legislation regulating interstate commerce and railroads specifically. Instead, he believed Congress sought only to prevent unreasonable or discriminatory charges rather than eliminate them altogether.