In the case of United States ex rel. Johnson et al. v. Payne, Secretary of the Interior in 1919, a group of Native American tribal members from the Five Civilized Tribes sued Franklin K. Lane, then-Secretary of the Interior, for allegedly mismanaging their lands and resources under his trust responsibility as established by Congress through various acts and treaties with these tribes. The plaintiffs sought to prevent further alleged abuses by seeking an injunction against Lane's actions regarding their property rights without due process or just compensation which they claimed violated their Fifth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court ruled against them stating that while it recognized that there were serious allegations made about potential mismanagement within the Department of Interior concerning Indian affairs; however, such matters fell outside its jurisdictional purview because they involved political questions best left to Congress' discretion rather than judicial review. Furthermore, it held that even if there was merit to these claims - something it did not decide on - any relief would have been prospective (i.e., preventing future harm) rather than retrospective (i.e., compensating past damages), thus making this a moot point since Lane had already resigned his post before this decision was rendered.

In the dissenting opinion for United States ex rel. Johnson et al. v. Payne, Secretary of the Interior, 1919, Justice Holmes argued that the majority's decision was flawed because it failed to consider important historical context and precedent related to Indian land rights. He contended that under previous treaties and laws enacted by Congress, Native American tribes were recognized as sovereign nations with inherent rights over their lands; therefore they should be able to lease these lands without federal government interference or approval. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's interpretation of an 1891 law which allowed leasing only on "surplus" reservation land not needed for tribal use - arguing instead this law did not apply in this case since it involved allotted lands given directly to individual tribe members rather than surplus communal tribal property.