In the case of United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, Director of Immigration in 1932, the Supreme Court ruled on an immigration issue involving a man named Antonio Volpe. Mr. Volpe had been deported to Italy after being convicted for a crime involving moral turpitude in the U.S., but later returned without permission from the Secretary of Labor as required by law at that time. The court held that his re-entry was unlawful and he could be deported again even though he had not committed any further crimes since returning to America. The decision clarified two points: firstly, it confirmed that deportation is not considered punishment for criminal conduct but rather a method to protect society; secondly, it established precedent regarding immigrants who return illegally after deportation - they are subject to removal regardless if they have engaged in additional criminal activity or not.

In the dissenting opinion for United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, it was argued that the petitioner should not be deported because his crime did not meet the definition of a "crime involving moral turpitude." The dissenting justices believed that Volpe's conviction for possessing alcohol during Prohibition was a regulatory offense rather than an inherently immoral act. They pointed out that many law-abiding citizens also violated this law due to their disagreement with it, and they didn't believe such violations were indicative of bad character or deserving of deportation. Furthermore, they disagreed with majority’s interpretation of immigration laws and felt these laws shouldn’t apply retroactively to crimes committed before their enactment. Thus, in their view, applying them in this way unfairly penalized individuals like Volpe who couldn't have anticipated these consequences at the time of their offenses.