In the United States v. Armour & Co., et al., 1970, the Supreme Court ruled on a case involving an antitrust consent decree. The government had previously filed an antitrust suit against several meat packers, including Armour & Co., alleging they conspired to restrain trade and monopolize interstate commerce in violation of the Sherman Act. A consent decree was entered into by both parties which prohibited certain activities but did not require divestiture or reorganization of any part of their businesses as initially sought by the government. Later, however, when some defendants violated this decree, the government sought further relief from court arguing that it should be able to seek additional remedies beyond those specified in original agreement because its initial complaint included demands for such measures. The Supreme Court disagreed with this argument stating that once a consent decree is approved and entered by a court after careful scrutiny ensuring fairness towards all parties involved; it becomes final and binding unless modified through appropriate legal procedures. It held that while courts have power to modify existing decrees if circumstances significantly change over time or facts were misrepresented during negotiation process; they cannot expand scope of agreed-upon terms based on allegations made prior to settlement.

In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Armour & Co., Justice Douglas argued that the majority's decision to uphold a consent decree between meat packers and the government was flawed because it did not adequately address anti-competitive practices in the industry. He believed that by allowing these companies to continue operating with minimal restrictions, they would maintain their monopolistic control over meat packing, which could lead to higher prices and less competition. Furthermore, he criticized the court's reliance on an outdated 1920 case (United States v. Swift & Co.) as precedent, arguing that its relevance had diminished due to significant changes in business practices since then. Overall, Justice Douglas felt this ruling failed to protect consumers from potential abuses of market power.