In the United States v. Birdsall case of 1913, several government officials were convicted for accepting bribes to influence their decision-making process in a pending prosecution. The defendants argued that they could not be prosecuted under federal bribery statutes because those laws only applied to cases where the bribe directly influenced an official act or duty. They contended that recommending clemency was not part of their official duties and thus outside the scope of these laws. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation and upheld their convictions. The court ruled that any action taken by a public officer which is influenced by gifts or promises can constitute an offense under federal bribery statutes, even if such actions are not explicitly defined as part of his/her formal responsibilities but are generally accepted functions associated with his/her position. This ruling expanded the definition of "official acts" within anti-bribery legislation to include more than just legally mandated duties.

In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Birdsall, Justice Holmes disagreed with the majority's interpretation of a statute that made it illegal to pay or receive bribes in relation to any claim pending before any department of the U.S government. He argued that this law was not intended to cover gratuities given after a decision had been made and did not apply if there was no intent to influence an official act. The justice believed that interpreting the law too broadly could potentially criminalize innocent conduct, such as giving gifts out of friendship or gratitude without intending them as bribes. Therefore, he dissented from the majority's ruling which upheld convictions based on payments received by federal officials after they had rendered decisions favorable to those making payments.