In the Matter of the United States v. Sherman M. Booth, a case heard before the Supreme Court in 1855, centered around whether or not an individual could be prosecuted for aiding and abetting a fugitive slave under federal law. The defendant, Sherman M. Booth, had been arrested by federal marshals after he helped to rescue Joshua Glover from slavery in Wisconsin; Glover was being held against his will by his former master who had brought him into free territory without legal papers proving that he was legally owned as property. The court ultimately ruled that Congress did not have authority to pass laws criminalizing such actions and thus overturned Booth's conviction on those grounds; however they also found that state governments were allowed to prosecute individuals who aided runaway slaves if their own laws permitted it so long as they did not conflict with any existing federal legislation regarding fugitives from service or labor.

In the Matter of the United States v. Sherman M. Booth, Chief Justice Taney delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that Congress did not have authority to pass laws interfering with state court proceedings or punishing individuals for acts done under color of state law. He further argued that such an act would be unconstitutional and beyond the scope of Congressional power as defined by Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Additionally, Taney contended that even if Congress had such power it could not constitutionally punish someone who acted within his rights according to state law at the time he committed his alleged offense; instead any punishment should only apply prospectively from when Congress passed its legislation on this matter. Finally, Taney asserted that since no federal statute existed at the time Booth was arrested for aiding a fugitive slave escape from custody under Wisconsin's personal liberty laws then there was no basis upon which to convict him and thus his conviction must be reversed and set aside as void ab initio (from inception).