In the United States v. Calamaro case of 1956, the Supreme Court ruled on whether a bookmaker was required to pay federal occupational tax. The defendant, Joseph Calamaro, argued that he was not liable for this tax as he did not accept bets himself but merely recorded them for his employer who accepted and paid off all wagers. However, the court held that under Section 3290 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), anyone involved in receiving or accepting wagers is considered engaged in taxable occupation and thus must pay an occupational tax. This includes individuals like Calamaro who record bets even if they do not personally accept them. Therefore, it concluded that Calamaro's activities fell within this definition and upheld his conviction for willful failure to pay such taxes.

In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Calamaro, Justice Frankfurter disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the term "engaged in receiving wagers" within Section 3290 of the Internal Revenue Code. He argued that this phrase should be interpreted more narrowly to only include those who accept bets on behalf of a principal or employer and not independent bookmakers like Calamaro. In his view, Congress intended to tax only those individuals involved in large-scale gambling operations rather than small-time operators such as Calamaro. Furthermore, he contended that if Congress had intended to tax all persons engaged in wagering activities regardless of their role or scale, it would have used broader language in drafting Section 3290. Therefore, he believed that applying this law against Calamaro was an overreach by federal authorities and violated principles of statutory construction.